Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games by Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg
Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated
Games
Ehud Lehrer¤and Dinah Rosenbergy
November 18, 2003
Abstract
Two players play an unknown zero-sum repeated game. Before the game
starts one player may receive signals, whose nature is speci¯ed by an informa-
tion structure, regarding the game actually played. We characterize when one
information structure is better for the maximizer than another. We also char-
acterize those functions de¯ned on partitions that determine the equilibrium
payo® when one player is informed about the cell of the partition that contains
the realized state.
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In a Bayesian game players have a prior distribution regarding the game played. Any
information that the players may receive about this game changes their posterior
distribution and hence their behavior. Thus, the information structure of the game
determines its equilibrium payo®s. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role
of information structures in repeated Bayesian games.
We study two issues: comparison of di®erent information structures and measure-
ment of the contribution of the information received. The ¯rst issue was addressed
by Blackwell (1951, 1953) in a model of the one-person decision problem. A state of
nature is randomly chosen with a given probability. Then, a decision maker obtains
a signal that depends on the state selected. This signal is stochastically determined
by an information structure. Upon receiving the signal, the decision maker takes an
action and receives a payo® that depends on the action chosen as well as on the state
of nature. It is said that the information structure, say, I, is better than another, say,
I0 if, regardless of the payo® function, I provides the decision maker with the ability
to obtain at least as high a payo® as he could obtain had the signal been determined
by I0. Blackwell showed that I is better than I0 if and only if by garbling the signals
obtained from I, the decision maker can reproduce a signal that appears like the
signals received through I0.
A lot of e®ort has been made to extend Blackwell's notion to interactive models.
It is well known that in some games, players might prefer dropping payo®-relevant
information, because their equilibrium payo® would then be higher (see Kamien et
al. (1990)). Bassan et al. (1999) presented conditions under which having more
information always improves all players' payo®s. Neyman (1991) pointed out that a
player might prefer not receiving information because other players would know that
he was receiving this information. Gossner (2000) compared information structures
through the correlated equilibrium distribution they induce.
As a ¯rst step towards a more comprehensive understanding of the role of infor-
mation, we consider zero-sum games. Examining the role of information is easier in
zero-sum games for two reasons. First, such games have a unique equilibrium payo®.
Second, receiving more information in such games can never be harmful: the equilib-
rium payo® of a player cannot decrease as a result of obtaining more information.
As in Blackwell's setting, in order to separate the impact of the information struc-
1ture from the idiosyncracies of a particular interaction, we examine the characteristics
of information structures that hold regardless of the payo® function. In this way we
focus on informational aspects rather than on utility aspects. As in one-player de-
cision problems, the question arises as to when one information structure yields as
high a maximizer payo® as another information structure, regardless of the payo®
function.
Our result that concerns comparison of di®erent structures applies to repeated
games with one-sided information (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995). It states that
the equilibrium payo® of the maximizer is as high in a game with the information
structure I as with the information structure I0 if I is more informative than I0.
The second issue discussed here is that of measuring the contribution of infor-
mation. This issue was ¯rst addressed by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who dealt with
one-player decision problems. The information structure is called partitional, if there
is a partition of the state space such that the information a player receives about the
realized state is the cell of the partition containing that state. In a decision problem
with a given partitional structure the decision maker has an optimal strategy which
yields the optimal payo®. The function that attaches the corresponding optimal pay-
o® to any partition is called a value-of-information function. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991)
characterized those functions (de¯ned on partitional information structures) that can
be realized as value-of-information functions.
We extend the model of Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) and determine what functions
(of partitional structures) can be realized as value-of-information functions in zero-
sum repeated games. That is, we characterize those functions, f, for which there
exists a repeated game such that for any partition, P, the value of the corresponding
game (with one-sided partitional information) coincides with f(P). Since getting
more information in zero-sum games is bene¯cial to the informed player, any value-
of-information should be monotonic (with respect to re¯nement of partitions).
It turns out that unlike the case of one decision maker, in repeated games with
one-sided information any monotonic function de¯ned over partitions is also a value-
of-information function. In other words, our second result states that there is no
further condition beyond the obvious one, monotonicity, that characterizes the value-
of-information functions.
In a companion paper (Lehrer and Rosenberg, 2003) we considered one-shot zero-
sum games. In that paper we extended the characterization of Gilboa and Lehrer
(1991) to one-sided and symmetric information structures.
2The main tool used to investigate the issues described above is the value function
of a one-shot zero-sum Bayesian game in which players receive no information beyond
the prior. The value of such a Bayesian game can be viewed as a function from priors
to numbers called the value of the game with no information. These functions play a
crucial role in particular in the characterization of the values of repeated games with
incomplete information (Aumann and Maschler (1995), Mertens et al. (1994)). The
problem, which is of interest in its own right, is to characterize the real functions
de¯ned over the set of priors that are the values of some game with no information.
This question is fully answered when there are two states of nature and remains open
in the general case. In the general case we provide the properties needed for the rest
of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. We
explain the notion of information structure and then introduce repeated games with
one-sided information. The main issues and results of this paper are described in
Section 3. Section 4 elaborates on zero-sum repeated games. Section 5 is devoted to
the tool of the main proofs: the value of games with no information. These proofs




We consider zero-sum two-player games with incomplete information. A state of
nature k is drawn from a ¯nite set K according to a known probability p: None of the
players is directly informed of the realized state k: The maximizing player receives
a signal that may depend on k through an information structure. Here we focus on
one-sided information structures, where only player 1 is (fully or partially) informed
of k.
Information structures which are the main subject of this paper are formally
de¯ned in what follows.
De¯nition 1 An information structure I = (S;¼) consists of
a. a set of signals: S for player 1;
3b. a (stochastic) information function ¼ from K to the set of probability distribu-
tions over S. Given the realized state k 2 K, ¼(sjk) denotes the probability that
player 1 receives the signal s in S.
In words, after the state k is chosen, player 1 receives a signal that depends on k.
A signal s 2 S is selected according to a probability distribution ¼(¢jk). Player 1 is
then informed of s and player 2 is not. Therefore, the information that player 1 has
on k is imbedded in ¼:
Remark 1 If the set S is a singleton, then no player receives information about k.
If S = K and s = k with probability 1, then player 1 is fully informed of k:
Another way to model an information structure is by partitions. Let P be a
partition of the parameter set K. Here the signalling structure is deterministic: when
the state k 2 K is realized, the signal that player 1 receives is the cell T in P that
contains k. If the information structure is determined by a partition, we say that it
is a partitional information structure.
A partitional information structure can also be written as an information struc-
ture. On the other hand, let I = (S;¼) be an information structure, and let e k denote
the pair (k;s) drawn from the set e K = K £ S with probability p(k)¼(sjk): We can
rewrite it as a partitional structure with e K being the state space and player 1's sig-
nals determined by the partition whose cells are the subsets of e K that have the form
f(k0;s0) 2 e Kjs0 = sg for some s 2 S. Therefore, the two set-ups are exchangeable.
For a given state there are only ¯nitely many partitional information structures,
while there is a continuum of information structures. When converting to a partitional
structure, di®erent information structures typically induce di®erent probabilities over
the state space. On the other hand, when converting from partitional information
structures to information structures, there are only ¯nitely many possible probability
distributions over the state space.
2.2 The repeated game
In this section we describe how the repeated game proceeds after the maximizer
receives his information. This game is closely related to the incomplete information
game de¯ned by Aumann and Maschler (1995).
The n-stage game with incomplete information, denoted by ¡n(p;I), where I =
(S;¼), is de¯ned by an integer n, an information structure I, a probability p over
4K, a ¯nite set of actions for each player i 2 f1;2g, Ai and a payo® function g from
K £ A1 £ A2 to the reals where the payo® associated with (k;a1;a2) is denoted by
gk(a1;a2). The game is played as follows. At stage 0 nature chooses an element k of
K with probability p and a signal in S according to probability ¼(¢jk). Player 1 is
then informed of the signal s.
Then the game is played in n stages. At stage m = 1;:::;n players 1 and 2
simultaneously choose actions according to probability distributions that may depend
on the history of previous actions and signals. If the realized state is k and the chosen
action is (am
1 ;am
2 ) the payo® at stage m is gk(am
1 ;am
2 ). The pair of the chosen action
(and not the payo®) is then announced to both players and the game proceeds to
its next stage. The payo® in ¡n(p;I) is the expected average of the n-stage payo®s
received during the game.
A behavior strategy of player 1 is a sequence ¿1 = (¿1
1;¿2
1;::::;¿m
1 ;::::) , where ¿m
1
is a function from his information at stage m; S £ (A1 £ A2)m¡1 to the set1 ¢(A1)
of probability distributions over his set of actions. A behavior strategy of player 2
is a sequence ¿2 = (¿1
2;¿2
2;::::;¿m
2 ;::::) where ¿m
2 is a function from his information
at stage m; (A1 £ A2)m¡1 to the set ¢(A2). When applied to the game ¡n(p;¼), all
¿m
i ; m > n; will be payo® irrelevant.
The probability distribution p;¼ and pair of strategies ¿1;¿2 induce a probability
over the set of histories of length n, Hn = K £ S £ (A1 £ A2)n. The expectation
with respect to this probability will be denoted by Ep;¼
¿1¿2 or simply by E when no
confusion can arise. If the players use the strategies ¿1;¿2, the associated payo® in











: This is the expected
average payo® received along the n stages of the game.
The game ¡n(p;I) is a ¯nite game and therefore, by the minmax theorem, has a
value denoted by vI
n(p;(gk)k2K): A basic property of the sequence of values is given
by the following proposition. Its proof is postponed to the appendix.
Proposition 1 The sequence vI
n(p;(gk)k2K) has a limit denoted by vI(p;(gk)k2K).
The function vI(p;(gk)k2K) will be referred to as the long-run value of the game.
The reason this value is of special interest is that in long games there is no time
constraint and therefore players may use their information in an unhindered fashion.
This seems to be a relevant notion in measuring the value of an information structure.
1Throughout this paper ¢(X) denotes the set of probability distributions over a set X:
5Remark 2 One could also de¯ne the in¯nitely repeated discounted version of this





m=1 ¸(1 ¡ ¸)m¡1gk(am
1 ;am
2 )] . For the same reason as above
this game has a value that is denoted by vI
¸(p;(gk)k2K) and lim¸!0 vI
¸(p;(gk)k2K) exists
and is equal to vI(p;(gk)k2K).
3 The main results
Our results deal with two issues: comparison of information structures and the value-
of-information. We start with the ¯rst.
3.1 Comparison of information structures
The ¯rst issue is concerned with the comparison of information structures. Since
in a zero-sum game there may be only one equilibrium payo® (the value), it is fairly
easy to de¯ne when an information structure is better for the maximizing player than
another information structure.
De¯nition 2 An information structure I is better for player 1 than I0 if for any
payo® function (gk)k2K and for any distribution p, vI(p;(gk)k2K) ¸ vI0(p;(gk)k2K):
By requiring that the value related to I is as high as that related to I0 for every
p and (gk)k2K we isolate the role of the information structure. The ¯rst issue of this
paper is to characterize in some interactive models when one structure is better for
player 1 than another. In the case of one player decision problems this question has
been solved by Blackwell who characterized better information structures as the ones
that are more informative.
We now want to clarify the notion of quantity of information available to a player.
To present Blackwell's result we need the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 3 An information structure I = (S;¼) is more informative than I0 =
(S0;¼0) if for each s 2 S there is a probability distribution Q(s) over S0 such that
¼0(s0jk) =
P
s2S ¼(sjk)Q(s)(s0) for every s0 2 S0 and k 2 K.
This de¯nition states that I is more informative than I0 if by garbling the signals
released through I a statistician can reproduce a signal that appears, in terms of the
6induced distributions, as a signal produced by I0: The garbling is done by choosing
an S0 signal according to the distribution Q(s) when receiving the signal s.
The following proposition translates the de¯nition of a more informative signal to
the case of partitional information structures, and will be useful in the sequel. Its
proof is postponed to the appendix.
Proposition 2 A one-player partition information structure P is more informative
than P0 if P is a re¯nement of P0 (namely, for any set T 2 P there is a set T 0 2 P0
such that T ½ T 0).
The following theorem laid the foundation of the ¯eld dealing with the comparison
of information structures.
Theorem 1 (Blackwell, 1953) An information structure I is better than I0 in a one-
player decision problem if and only if it is more informative.
Our ¯rst result extends Blackwell's result to the case of two-player repeated games
with one-sided information.
Theorem 2 An information structure I is better than I0 for player 1 in a repeated
game with one-sided information if and only if it is more informative.
The proof of this theorem relies on the result of Section 5 and is therefore post-
poned to Section 6.
3.2 The value of information
For a ¯xed payo® function (gk)k2K and a ¯xed distribution p, de¯ne the value of the
information structure I to be vI(p;(gk)k2K): The second issue of this paper is the
axiomatic characterization of such functions. Speci¯cally, let V (I) be a function
over information structures I. The question arises as to when there exist payo® func-
tions (gk)k2K and a distribution p over K such that for any I; V (I) = vI(p;(gk)k2K):
Answering this question amounts to giving axioms that characterize functions that
measure the value of information.
This question is easier to analyze in the partitional structure case because there
are only ¯nitely many partitions of K. The problem then amounts to characteriz-
ing functions over the ¯nite set of partitions of K that may be value-of-information
functions.
7The same problem in the setting of a one-player decision problem has been an-
alyzed by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991). Gilboa and Lehrer characterized the value-of-
information functions in partitional information structures. The one-player case is a
particular case of a zero-sum game (with player 2 having only one action).
There are more zero-sum games than one-player decision problems. Therefore,
there are more value-of-information functions of zero-sum games than of a one-
player decision problems. Thus, the conditions that characterize value-of-information
functions of zero-sum games are less restrictive than those characterizing value-of-
information functions of one-player decision problems.
The value-of-information functions of repeated games with one-sided information
are formally de¯ned in what follows.
De¯nition 4 A function f de¯ned over all the partitions of K is the value of in-
formation of a one-sided incomplete information game with partitional information
structure if there is a distribution p over K and if there are payo® functions (gk)k2K
such that for any partition P over K, f(P) = vP(p;(gk)k2K).
We restrict our attention to partitional structures and characterize the value-of-
information functions. By Theorem 2 and Proposition 2, one partitional information
structure is more informative than another if and only if it re¯nes it. However, when
one partition re¯nes another, the value of the game that corresponds to the ¯rst is
higher than the value of the game that corresponds to the second. Therefore, the
following monotonicity condition is clearly necessary.
De¯nition 5 A function v from the set of partitions of a ¯nite set K to the real
numbers is said to be monotonic if for any two partitions P and P0, the fact that
P re¯nes P0 (i.e., for any T 2 P there is an T 0 2 P0 such that T ½ T 0) implies
v(P) ¸ v(P0).
Theorem 3 states that this condition is also su±cient.
Theorem 3 Let V be a function from the set of partitions of K to the real numbers.
The function V is a value-of-information function of a repeated game with state space
K, one-sided information, and partitional signaling if and only if it is monotonic.
The proof of this theorem relies on the results proven in Section 5 and is postponed
to Section 6.
84 More on games with one-sided information
In this section we prove a general result on repeated games with one-sided information
that will be used in the proof of the main results. A particular case of the model
presented in Section 2.2 is that in which S = K and ¼(s = kjk) = 1. It means
that player 1 knows the realized k whereas player 2 does not. Aumann and Maschler
(1995) characterized the value vI(p;(gk)k2K) in this case.
Notation 1 Let u(p) denote the value of the one-shot zero-sum game with the action
sets A1;A2 and the payo® is
P
k2K p(k)gk(a1;a2) when the pair of actions (a1;a2) is
played.
u(p) is the value of the one-shot game where no player has any information beyond
the prior p. This function plays a central role in the theory of repeated games with
incomplete information. The next section elaborates on it.
Notation 2 Let f be a real valued function de¯ned on ¢(K). Then cav(f) denotes
the minimal concave function that is above f:
Theorem 4 (Aumann and Maschler, 1995) In a repeated one-sided information game
where player 1 is fully informed of the state, i.e. S = K and ¼(kjk) = 1, the value of
information, vI(p;(gk)k2K); is equal to cav(u)(p).
Our ¯rst goal is to extend this characterization. We denote by ¼p(¢js) the condi-
tional probability over K given the signal s, that is, ¼p(kjs) =
p(k)¼(sjk) P
l2K p(l)¼(sjl).




rI(s) is the probability of obtaining the signal s under the information structure I.
Notation 4 For an information structure I = (S;¼) denote by M(I) the set of
matrices M = (mis)i·D
s2S
with D lines (D can be any positive integer) and jSj columns




mis = 1 and for any s,
P
i·D mis = rI(s): For
such a matrix we denote by mi the quantity
P
s2S mis, and by pi(M) the probability















¯ M 2 M(I)
)
:
The de¯nition of M implies, in particular, that
P
i·D mipi(M) = p. Thus, the
value vI(p;(gk)k2K) is a kind of local concavi¯cation of u. Note, however, that the
constraints on M are more restrictive than just
P
i·D mipi(M)= p:
Proof. We de¯ne ¯rst an auxiliary game with one-sided information in which
player 1 is fully informed of the state of nature. The set of states of nature in this
game is S, the sets of actions of the players remain unchanged and the payo® for a
pair of actions a1;a2 in state s is gs(a1;a2) =
P
k2K ¼p(kjs)gk(a1;a2): The probability
of the state s is r(S;¼)(s) =
P
k2K p(k)¼(sjk).
The original game is now viewed as a game with incomplete information as de¯ned
in Aumann and Maschler (1995), where the states are player 1's signals. The payo®
function in the auxiliary game is naturally de¯ned as the appropriate expected payo®
of the original game. It is easily seen that the values of the n-stage repetitions of
both games, the original and the auxiliary, are the same.
Thus, r(S;¼) is the distribution over the new set of states. By Theorem 4 the long
run value of this game is cav(u)(r(S;¼)); where u denotes the value of the auxiliary
game in which player 1 gets no information about S:
For any q in ¢(S), let pq 2 ¢(K) satisfy pq(k) =
P
s2S q(s1)¼p(kjs): We prove
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qi 2 ¢(S1);
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qi(s)¼p(kjs) = pqi(k): (1)






miu(pi(M)) j M 2 M(I)
)
: (2)
















Equations (2) and (3) yield the desired result.
5 The main tool: the value of games with no in-
formation
The previous section demonstrates the signi¯cance of the function u(p). It turns out
that knowing the properties of this function is the key to proving our main results.
This section is devoted to the study of u(p). It seems that the importance of this study
lies beyond the current context. Therefore, the subject is presented in a self-contained
manner.
A zero-sum Bayesian game is de¯ned by a set K of states, a zero-sum game Gk
for every k 2 K and a probability p over K. A game Gk is chosen with probability
p(k) and is played once. Denote by ¹ G(p) the average game,
P
k2K p(k)Gk, and its
value by u(p).
The set K and the games Gk, k 2 K, induce a function u(p) whose domain is the
set of probability distributions over K.
De¯nition 6 Let ¢(K) be the set of probability distributions over the ¯nite set K.
We say that a function u de¯ned on ¢(K) is realizable if there are Gk, k 2 K, such
that the value of ¹ G(p) is u(p) for every p in ¢(K) .
Our task in this section is to study the set of realizable functions. The results
obtained in this framework will be used to prove the theorems stated in the previous
sections.










. When the distribution is (q;1 ¡
q), the average game is
µ
q 0
2q ¡ 1 q
¶











. Referred to as
G1 of another game, together with the original G2, one obtains a game whose value





is added to these G1 and
G2, one obtains a game whose value function is u(q) = q2 + 3q + 5.
De¯nition 7 A function u is piecewise rational, if it is continuous and if there are
¯nitely many rational functions such that at any point p, u coincides with one of
them.
The next proposition holds for any ¯nite set of states.
Proposition 4 If u is realizable, then it is piecewise rational.
Proof. Let G be the incomplete information game that realizes u. For any p let
I0(p) µ I (resp. J0(p) µ J) be a minimal set (with respect to inclusion) of player 1's
(resp. player 2's) actions which have been assigned a positive probability by one of
his optimal strategies. The value of G(p) when the players are restricted to I0 and to
J0 is equal to u(p).
Fix I0 µ I and J0 µ J. For any p such that I0 = I0(p) and J = J0(p), an
optimal strategy of player 1, x(p), satis¯es the following system of linear equations








k2K xi(p)pkgk(i;j0) j;j0 2 J0;
and
P
i2I xi(p) = 1:
(4)
Let S(p) be the set of solutions of system (4). Typically, S(p) contains more than
one point, and moreover, not all the points in S(p) are optimal strategies of player 1.
Let d be the dimension of S(p). S(p) may be obtained by the diagonal method.
It is, therefore, the image of f : I R
d ! I R
jI0j, f = (f1;:::;fjI0j), where fi is linear for
every i 2 I0. Moreover, the coe±cients of fi are rational functions of the numbers in
(4). The optimal strategies are the intersection of S(p) with the non-negative orthant.
This is the image of a polygon in I R
d, say D(p), by f. The polygon D(p) is de¯ned
by ¯nitely many linear inequalities whose coe±cients are all rational functions of the
numbers in (4).
12The value of G(p) is the maximum of a linear functional over D(p). This linear
functional is also rational in the coe±cients of (4). The maximum is attained in one
of the extreme points of D(p), de¯ned by a set of linear inequalities (over I R
d) whose
coe±cients are rational in the coe±cients appearing in (4). Any speci¯c extreme
point induces a rational function in p. Thus, the value may take the value of one of
the rational functions, depending on the extreme point of D(p), where the maximum
is attained.
To conclude, for each pair I0;J0 there is a polygon DI0J0(p) de¯ned by inequalities
whose coe±cients are rational in the numbers of (4). The maximum attained by the
linear functional (which provides the value of the game) over DI0J0(P) is a rational
function, denoted by uI0J0(p). Thus, for each I0 and J0 there is a piecewise rational
function uI0J0. For any p there is a pair I0 and J0 such that the rational function
uI0J0(p) is the value of the game. Since there are ¯nitely many pairs I0 and J0, u is
piecewise rational.
5.1 The case of two states
In this subsection we restrict the discussion to the case where there are only two
states( jKj = 2). Thus, ¢(K) is actually the interval [0;1] .
Lemma 1 If u is realizable, then so are cu, for c > 0, and ¡u.
Proof. Suppose that u is realizable by A = G1 and B = G2. Then cu is realizable
by cA and cB, and ¡u is realizable by ¡AT ¡BT.
Lemma 2 If u and v are realizable, then so is u + v.
Proof. Suppose that u is realizable by A = G1 and B = G2. Furthermore, v is
realizable by C = G1 and D = G2. Denote by Aij the matrix A+cij, where cij is the
ij-th entry of the matrix C. Similarly, let Bij = B + dij, where dij is the ij-th entry
of the matrix D.
De¯ne e G1 to be the matrix (Aij)ij, whose ij-th entry is the matrix Aij. Similarly,
let e G2 be the matrix (Bij)ij. The value function of the game with matrices e G1 and
e G2 is u + v
Lemma 3 If u is realizable, then so is u2.
13Proof. It is su±cient to show it when u is bounded between 0 and 1. This is so
because when au+b, where a and b are scalars, is realizable, then due to the previous
lemmas, by subtracting the realizable function 2abu + b2 , and then dividing by a2,
one obtains a realizable function.
Assume that u is realizable by A = G1 and B = G2. Let e G1 =
µ
A 0






2B ¡ 1 B
¶
. The value function of this game is u2.
Lemma 4 If u and v are realizable, then so is uv.
Proof. By the previous lemma, (u + v)2 is realizable. Thus by subtracting the
realizable functions u2 and v2 one obtains 2uv.
An immediate consequence is,
Corollary 1 Any polynomial is realizable.
Lemma 5 If u and v are positive and realizable, with no common root, then uv
u+v is
realizable.
Proof. Suppose that u is realizable by A = G1 and B = G2. Furthermore,
v is realizable by C = G0
1 and D = G0











. The value function of this game is uv
u+v.
Lemma 6 If u is a polynomial which does not vanish in 0;1, then 1
u is realizable.
Proof. Suppose that u is positive on the interval [0;1]. Let the minimum of u be
denoted by c. By applying the previous lemma to u¡c and c, one obtains that
(u¡c)c
u
is realizable. By subtracting c and multiplying by 1
¡c2 one obtains the desired result.
We therefore obtain,
Proposition 5 Any rational function de¯ned on [0;1] whose denominator does not
vanish in the interval is realizable.
Proposition 6 Any piecewise rational function is realizable.
14Proof. For convenience, let us say that the relevant rational function for the i-th
interval is ri. Without loss of generality, ri is either greater or smaller than ri¡1 in
the i-th interval. (Otherwise, one can re¯ne the original partition in order to obtain
it.)
Proceeding, say, from left to right, we have the ¯rst rational function in the ¯rst
interval, r1. Now for the second interval, we de¯ne a function, called s2. Suppose
that r2 is greater than r1 on the second interval. The function s2 is: a. continuous;
b. linear and smaller than r1 on the ¯rst interval; and c. equal to r2 on the rest. This
can be done by taking the minimum of r2 and some, properly chosen, linear function.
(If r2 is smaller than r1 on the second interval, the function s2 is: a. continuous; b.
linear and greater than r1 on the ¯rst interval; and c. equal to r2 on the rest.) The
function s2 is realizable as the minimum between r2 and a linear (thus realizable)
function l2 that is smaller than r1 and r2 on the ¯rst interval and greater than r2 on
the second (such a function exists).
After having r1 and s2, we form a game whose payo® is the maximum of r1 and
s2. The payo® function of this game is called w2(p). (If r2 is smaller than r1 on the
second interval, we take the minimum of r1 and s2.)
The general step: Suppose that after stage i of the process we obtained wi(p),
which coincides with rj on the j-th interval, j = 1;:::;i, and with ri on the internals
i + 1;i + 2:::.
Suppose that ri+1 is greater than wi on the i + 1 interval (this is without loss of
generality from above). The function si+1 is: a. continuous; b. linear and smaller
than wi on the ¯rst i intervals; and c. equal to ri+1 on the rest. After obtaining si+1,
we form a game whose payo® is the maximum of wi and si+1 . The payo® function
of this game is called wi+1(p). Similarly to the ¯rst step, si+1 is realizable as the
minimum between ri+1 and li+1, a linear function that is smaller than all wi on the
¯rst i intervals and greater than wi ri+1 on the rest (such a function exists).
At the end of the process we obtain the desired piecewise rational function.
The previous proposition and Proposition 4 imply the following
Theorem 5 A function is realizable if and only if it is piecewise rational.
5.2 The general symmetric case
In this subsection we extend the discussion to any ¯nite state space K.
15Lemma 7 If u is realizable, then so is u2.
Proof. We use the same method as in the proof of Lemma 3. If u is realizable
by the game G1;:::;GjKj then the game whose i-th matrix game is
µ
Gi 0
2Gi ¡ 1 Gi
¶
realizes u2.
Proposition 7 Any polynomial is realizable.
Proof. By induction on jKj. By Corollary 1 the claim is true for the case of
jKj = 2. Let f(q1;:::;qjKj¡1) be a polynomial with jKj ¡ 1 variables. By the method
of Lemma 2's proof, in order to show that f is realizable, it is su±cient to show that
any monom is realizable.









able as a game with jKj¡1 states. By adding an identically zero matrix, one obtains
a game with jKj states whose value function is r1.
r2 = q
`jKj¡1
jKj¡1 is a polynomial with one variable and thus can be realized by a game
with two states. Let G1 and G2 be the matrices corresponding to the two states.
Using this game we will de¯ne a game with jKj states, G0
1;:::;G0
jKj, as follows. Let
G0
jKj = G1 and G0
i = G2; i 6= jKj. The value function of the new game is r2.
Since 2r1r2 = (r1 + r2)2 ¡ r2
1 ¡ r2
2, r1r2 is realizable. Thus, every monom is
realizable and therefore so is any polynomial.
This implies the following
Corollary 2 Given a ¯nite number of pairs (x`;y`) 2 ¢(K)£I R , ` = 1;:::;L, there
is a realizable function u such that u(x`) = y`, ` = 1;:::;L.
Lemma 8 If u and v are realizable than so are maxfu;vg and minfu;vg.
Proof. Suppose that f is realizable. Then by adding a row of 0's to each matrix
game, one obtains a game that realizes maxff;0g. Thus, maxfu;vg = v + maxfu ¡
v;0g is realizable and so is minfu;vg = ¡maxf¡u;¡vg.
De¯nition 8 A set C is semi-algebraic if it is a ¯nite union of sets of form
n
x 2 I R
k; f1(x) = f2(x) = ::: = f`(x) = 0;r1(x) > 0;r2(x) > 0;:::;rm(x) > 0
o
;
where f1;:::;f`;r1;:::;rm are polynomials.
16Proposition 8 Let C be a closed semi-algebraic set. Then there is a realizable func-
tion u that satis¯es u(x) · 0 when x 2 C, and u(x) > 0, otherwise.
Proof. Let D be a set of form
n
x 2 I R
k; f1(x) = f2(x) = ::: = f`(x) = 0;r1(x) ¸ 0;r2(x) ¸ 0;:::;rm(x) ¸ 0
o
;
where f1;:::;f`;r1;:::;rm are polynomials. By Proposition 7, f1;:::;f`;r1;:::;rm are
realizable and by Lemma 8, uD = minff1;:::;f`;¡f1;:::;¡f`;r1;:::;rmg is realizable.
Clearly, uD(x) ¸ 0 when x 2 C and uD(x) < 0, otherwise. Since any closed semi-
algebraic set is a ¯nite union of such D's (see Bochnak et al. (1988), p. 46), the
desired u is u = ¡maxfuDgD, which is also realizable.
Since a closed polygon is in particular a closed semi-algebraic, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 3 If C is a ¯nite union of closed polygons, then there is a realizable func-
tion u that satis¯es u(x) · 0 when x 2 C, and u(x) > 0 otherwise.
By taking the maximum with zero one obtains,
Corollary 4 If C is a closed polygon, then there is a realizable function u that sat-
is¯es u(x) = 0 when x 2 C, and u(x) > 0 otherwise.
Corollary 5 If C1 is ¯nite, C2 is a union of closed polygons, C1 \ C2 = ; and c1
and c2 are two numbers such that c1 > c2, then there is a realizable function u that
satis¯es u(x) · c2 when x 2 C2, u(x) = c1 when x 2 C1, and u(x) · c1 otherwise.
Proof. A union of closed polygons is a closed semi-algebraic set. Therefore, by
Proposition 8, there is a realizable function u which is less than or equal to 0 on
C2 and greater than 0 otherwise. Let c be the minimum of u over the set C1. By
multiplying u with the constant
c1¡c2
c and adding c2 one obtains a realizable function
u0 that satis¯es u0(x) · c2 when x 2 C2 and u0(x) ¸ c1 when x 2 C1. Taking the
minimum of u0 and c1 would yield the desired realizable function.
Proposition 9 Let C1 and C2 be two disjoint closed semi-algebraic sets, and f1 and
f2 two realizable functions. Then, there is a realizable function u that satis¯es u(x) =
f1(x) when x 2 C1, and u(x) = f2(x) when x 2 C2.
17Proof. By Proposition 8, for i = 1;2, there is u0
i which is at least 0 on Ci and
less than 0 otherwise. Consider ui = maxfminfu0
i+1;1g;0g; ui is realizable, bounded
between 0 and 1, and equal to 1 on Ci and less than 1 otherwise.
For any integer `i, u
`i
i is also realizable. It is bounded between 0 and 1, and is
equal to 1 on Ci and less than 1 otherwise. By adding a large positive number, say
M, we may assume that the functions f1 and f2 are positive. There are su±ciently
large `i's such that fj > fiu
`i




2 g is realizable and
(subtracting M, if necessary) satis¯es the desired properties.
We do not know how to prove that if C1 and C2 are closed and semi-algebraic
sets and if f1 and f2 are realizable functions such that f1 = f2 on C1
T
C2 then the
function u de¯ned by u(p) = f1(p) if p 2 C1 and u(p) = f2(p) if p 2 C2 is realizable.
6 Proofs of the main theorems
In this section we prove the main results of the previous section.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume ¯rst that I = (S;¼) is more informative than I0 =








where for each s 2 S, Q(s) is a probability distribution over S0.


















































































































We now show that mi = m0

















































































i miu(pi(M)) which implies that for any payo® function (gk)k2K, vI(p;(gk)k2K) ¸
vI0(p;(gk)k2K):
As for the inverse direction of the theorem, let I = (S;¼) and I0 = (S0;¼0) be two
information structures such that for any payo® function (gk)k2K, vI(p;(gk)k2K) ¸
vI0(p;(gk)k2K): In particular, for any payo® function that does not depend on the
moves of player 2, vI(p;(gk)k2K) ¸ vI0(p;(gk)k2K): However, such a game is a one-
player decision problem since player 2 is dummy. Thus, I is better than I0 for any one-
player decision problem. By Blackwell (1953) this implies that I is more informative
than I0.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let V be a monotonic function over partitions. Let p be
( 1
jKj;:::; 1
jKj). Order all partitions of K: P1;:::;P`, so that if j < i then V (Pj) · V (
Pi), and therefore Pj does not re¯ne Pi.
Notation 5 Let P be a partition. Denote by H(P) the space in I R
jKj spanned by
f1 lT; T 2 Pg, where 1lT denotes the characteristic vector of the set T.
19Note that the partition P re¯nes P0 if and only if H(P)0 is a subspace of H(P). This
implies in particular that dim[H(Pj) \ H(Pi)] <dimH(Pi) for i > j.
We would like to prove that for any i · ` the following property, denoted by Ai,
holds: there is a realizable function u such that for any j · i, and every p 2 H(Pj),
u(p) · V (Pj). Furthermore, for any j · i there is a Dj £ l matrix3 Mj 2 M(Pj)
such that for any r · Dj , u(pr(Mj)) = V (Pj):
We proceed by induction over i. Let i = 1. The partition P1 is the trivial partition
and u can be taken to be the constant function V (P1): Now assume that Ai¡1 holds
and denote by ui¡1 the corresponding realizable function.
Step 1: De¯nition of a class of matrices.
Consider the following square matrix, M1, with jPij columns, all of whose entries
except for those on the diagonal, are zero. The diagonal entry corresponding to
T 2 Pi is p(T). Note that for every row r of M1, pr(M1) 6= p. De¯ne M2 as a matrix
of the same dimension whose entries in the column corresponding to the cell T 2 Pi
are all equal to
p(T)
D : Obviously, M1;M2 2 M(Pi). De¯ne M = ®M1 + (1 ¡ ®)M2.
If ® is positive and su±ciently small, then M 2 M(Pi) and for every row r of M,
pr(M) 6= p. Furthermore, all entries of M are strictly positive.




T2Pi "T = 0g. For every v 2 H(Pi)0 let
arT = mr"Thpr(M) ¡ p;vi; r · D; T 2 Pi. Consider the matrix Mv whose (r;T)-th
entry is mrT +arT. If the "T's that de¯ne v are small enough, then the entries of Mv
are positive.
We show now that Mv is in M(Pi). This is so since
P
r mrT + arT = p(T) +
P
r mr"Thpr(M) ¡ p;vi = p(T) + "Th
P
r mrpr(M) ¡ p;vi = p(T). The last equality
is due to the fact that
P
r mrpr(M) = p.
Step 2: Proof of the claim that there is v 2 H(Pi)0 such that for any row





T2Pi mr"Thpr(M)¡p;vi = mrhpr(M)¡p;vi
P
T2Pi "T =
0: Therefore, pr(Mv) = pr(M) + hpr(M) ¡ p;vi
P
T "T¼p(¢jT) = pr(M) + hpr(M) ¡
p;viv. If the claim is incorrect, then there is a neighborhood of H(Pi)0 around the
origin, denoted W, such that for every v 2 W there is j < i and a row r such
that pr(Mv) = pr(M) + hpr(M) ¡ p;viv 2 H(Pj). De¯ne the set Frj to be the set
containing v 2 W such that pr(M)+hpr(M)¡p;viv 2 H(Pj), where W is the closure
(the relative one in H(Pi)0) of W. Frj is a closed set for every r and j.
3Recall Notation 4. Pj in M(Pj) stands for the information structure that corresponds to the
partition Pj.
20By assumption, the union of the closed sets Frj contains W. Since W, as a
complete space, is of category II, at least one of the Frj's contains an open set. Thus,
there are j and r so that pr(M)+hpr(M)¡p;viv 2 H(Pj) for v0s in an open (recall,
in W) set.
Note that for every v 2 W, pr(M) + hpr(M) ¡ p;viv 2 H(Pi) \ ¢(K). Fur-
thermore, since pr(M) ¡ p 6= 0, the map v 7! pr(M) + hpr(M) ¡ p;viv is an open
map. Thus, H(Pj) \ ¢(K) contains an open set of H(Pi) \ ¢(K). Since both
are intersections of linear spaces whose spanning vectors are in ¢(K) with ¢(K),
it implies that H(Pj) \ ¢(K) contains H(Pi) \ ¢(K). However, when j < i,
dim[H(Pj) \ H(Pi)] <dimH(Pi). This implies that H(Pi)\¢(K) is not included in
H(Pj) \ ¢(K). We therefore conclude that there exists a matrix, which we denote
now by Mi, in M(Pi) that satis¯es pr(Mi) = 2 [j<iH(Pj) for every row r of Mi.
Step 3: Conclusion of the proof.
By Corollary 5, there is a realizable function g that satis¯es:
² for every row r of Mi, g attains its maximum, V (Pi), on pr(Mi); and
² g is smaller than or equal to min1·j·i¡1 V (Pj) on [1·j·i¡1H(Pj) \ ¢(K).
By taking the maximum of g and the function ui¡1 we get a realizable function
ui that satis¯es:
(a) for any j · i, ui is smaller than or equal to V (Pj) on H(Pj) \ ¢(K); and
(b) for any j · i, there is a Dj£l matrix Mj 2 M(Pj) such that for any 1 · r · Dj,
u(pr(Mj)) = V (Pj):
Property A` is therefore proven by induction. Let (gk)k2K be the payo® functions
that realize u`. (a) implies that vPiO(p;(gk)k2K) · V (Pi) for every i · `. Proposition
3 and (b) imply that vPiO(p;(gk)k2K) = V (Pj), which completes the proof.
7 Comments and open problems
7.1 The value-of-information function in one-shot games
Theorem 3 deals with the value of information in a repeated one-sided game with
partitional information. In Lehrer and Rosenberg (2003) we characterize the value-
of-information functions in one-shot games with partitional information in two cases:
one-sided and symmetric information.
217.2 The value of ¯nite games with one-sided information
In Section 5 we analyzed the value of games with no information. The one-sided case
remains open. Suppose that a game Gk is chosen with probability p(k), is informed
to the maximizing player and is played once. Denote the value of this game by w(p).
It is clear that every such function w is a function u of another symmetric game.
Moreover, any such function is concave. The question arises as to whether every
concave function which is a value-of-information function of a symmetric game is a
value-of-information function of a ¯nite one-shot one-sided information game?
7.3 The symmetric case with a general state space
In Section 5 we could fully characterize the value of games with no information and
only two states. In the case where there are more than two states we have only
partial results. We could prove that every polynomial is realizable and that for every
continuous piecewise rational function q and every " > 0 there is a realizable function
u that coincides with q over a set whose Lesbegue measure is 1 ¡ " (where the entire
¢(K) has measure 1).
We conjecture that every continuous piecewise rational function over ¢(K), as in
the two-state case, is realizable.
7.4 The value of games with bounded payo®s
In the discussion of Section 5 we imposed no restrictions on the payo®s. An inter-
esting question concerns game with bounded payo®s. More speci¯cally, what are the
realizable functions with games whose payo®s are bounded between 0 and 1?
7.5 General information structures
In Theorem 3 we focus on partitional signaling structure. It would be interesting to
characterize functions of a general signaling structure that are value-of-information
functions.
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239 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We rewrite the game as a zero-sum game with incom-
plete information on one side as de¯ned in Aumann and Maschler. Denote by ¹ the
probability on S de¯ned by ¹(s) =
P
k2K p(k)¼(sjk): Consider a zero-sum game with
incomplete information with state space S. Player 1 is informed of s and player 2 is




The corresponding value of the n¡th stage game is denoted by wn(¹): It is easily
seen that wn(¹) = vI
n(p;(gk)k2K): By Aumann and Maschler, wn(¹) converges as n
goes to in¯nity to w(¹) and therefore v¼
n(p;(gk)k2K) also converges to v¼(p;(gk)k2K) =
w(¹):
Recall that ¼p(¢js) denotes the conditional probability over K given the signal s.
That is, ¼p(kjs) =
p(k)¼(sjk) P
l2K p(l)¼(sjl). Also, denote ¼(s) =
P
k2K p(k)¼(sjk).
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by ¼ the information structure corresponding to
the partition P and by ¼0 the information structure corresponding to P0: for any
T 2 P, ¼(Tjk) = 1 if and only if k 2 T, otherwise ¼(Tjk) = 0. The de¯nition of ¼0 is
similar.
Assume ¯rst that P is a re¯nement of P0. For any T 2 P and T 0 2 P0 let us
de¯ne Q(T)(T 0) to be 1 if T ½ T 0 and 0 otherwise: This is a transition probability
from P to P0 because since both are partitions for any T there is a unique T 0 in P0
that contains T, and for any k, ¼0(T 0jk) =
P
T2P Q(T)(T 0)¼(Tjk):
Assume now that ¼ and ¼0 are derived from two partitional information struc-
tures P and P0, and that ¼ is more informative than ¼0: This means that there is a
probability distribution Q(T) for all T 2 P on P0, such that for any k, ¼0(T 0jk) =
P
T2P Q(T)(T 0)¼(Tjk): Fix T 2 P and let k 2 T. For any T 0 2 P0, ¼0(T 0jk) =
Q(T)(T 0), so that Q(T)(T 0) 2 f0;1g: Hence, for any T, there is exactly one T 0 such
that Q(T)(T 0) = 1; and ¼0(T 0jk) = 1, so that k 2 T 0: This implies that P is a
re¯nement of P0:
24